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Differentiated Integration and the Single Supervisory Mechanism: which way 
forward for the European Banking Authority? 
 
Pierre Schammo
*
 
 
Abstract 
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as the first pillar of 
an EU Banking Union, represents a significant step towards greater integration in 
banking supervision. However, the scope of the SSM is limited to a group of Member 
States. Member States such as the UK have insisted that they will not be part of the 
SSM. These non-participating Member States (NoPS) will nevertheless interact 
closely with SSM members, notably within the European Banking Authority (EBA). 
In order to organise their interactions, the EU legislature amended EBA’s founding 
regulation. In particular, it introduced complex voting requirements. The aim of this 
paper is to reflect on these changes and to consider alternative arrangements for EBA.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
*
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1. Introduction 
The year 2014 will be remembered as a year of considerable change in the banking 
field. It saw the coming into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – the 
EU’s ‘first step towards a banking union’.1 The SSM will place the European Central 
Bank (ECB) at the heart of a new system of banking supervision.2 It will bring about a 
higher level of integration in supervision. Crucially, however, it will not cover the 
whole of the EU. It will be limited to Eurozone countries and (non-euro) Member 
States that decide to join the SSM.  
Because of its limited scope, the SSM is also an example of differentiated 
integration. A term of many meanings,3 it describes the basic idea of variation among 
states which pursue integration: some deciding to join in initiatives advancing 
integration of which others decide to abstain. In the context of the SSM, those latter 
Member States (non-participating Member States or NoPS) will not be part of the 
SSM. Yet, their interactions with the SSM will nonetheless be close: that is, within 
the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) which covers the whole of the 
EU and especially within the European Banking Authority (EBA) which is part of the 
ESFS and which, unlike the SSM, brings together competent authorities from all of 
the twenty-eight Member States. The point about these interactions is worth noting. 
                                                          
1
 Rec (12) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
[2013] OJ L 287/63. See also rec (2) Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 [2013] OJ L 287/29 
(hereinafter, EBA Amending Regulation).  
2
 For first contributions on the SSM, see E. Ferran and V. Babis, The European Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255 (2013); R. Lastra, Banking Union and Single 
Market: Conflict or Companionship 36 Fordham International Law Journal 1190 (2013); E. 
Wymeersch, The Single Supervisory Mechanism or “SSM”, Part One of the Banking Union (ECGI 
Law Working Paper No. 240/2014, February 2014); G. Ferrarini and L. Chiarella, Common Banking 
Supervision in the Eurozone: Strengths and Weaknesses (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 223/2013, 
August 2013); T. Tröger, The Single Supervisory Mechanism – Panacea or Quack Banking 
Regulation? (SAFE Working Paper Series No. 27, October 2013).  
3
 E.g. A. Stubb, A Categorization of Differentiated Integration, 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 
283 (1996).  
They prompted the EU legislature to review the regulation governing EBA (the EBA 
Regulation) and to amend its voting arrangements substantially. 4  The aim of this 
paper is to reflect on these changes and in this process to map out alternatives for 
EBA. The changes which the EU legislature adopted are open to criticism. They are 
short sighted and fail to give sufficient consideration to the functioning of EBA. This 
chapter therefore evaluates alternative approaches. The aim is to find a better balance 
between the interests of Member States, whose competent authorities are the main 
decision-makers in EBA, and the proper functioning of EBA. Specifically, it is argued 
that the way forward is to rethink EBA’s governance more fundamentally. This 
chapter will set out the basic requirements of such an approach.   
Underpinning much of the discussion that follows are a number of 
observations about differentiated integration and the changes that were made to the 
EBA Regulation. At the outset, it is important to appreciate that whilst differentiated 
integration is a means to accommodate heterogeneous preferences for closer 
integration,  it is also a likely source of tension between Member States. NoPS for 
example are likely to be concerned about externalities associated with differentiated 
integration. But they are also likely to concerned about the potential political costs of 
deciding to abstain from participation in closer integration. Specifically, NoPS such as 
the UK are concerned about a possible loss of influence in EU decision-making fora. 
They fear the prospect of ‘caucusing’ among states participating in closer integration. 
It is this sort of reasoning which explains the thinking behind the recent changes to 
the EBA Regulation. For the UK, the fact that a majority of EBA members would 
originate from SSM Member States meant that its interests in EBA were at risk. The 
asymmetry between NoPS and SSM members within EBA’s Board of Supervisors 
                                                          
4
 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision 
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC [2013] OJ L331/12.  
demanded therefore substantial changes, a view which was ultimately accepted by the 
EU legislature.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by presenting the SSM and 
the ESFS and especially the role of the ECB and EBA under the SSM and the ESFS 
respectively. Section 3 goes on to examine the way in which the EU legislature dealt 
with the concerns of NoPS. Given the importance of EBA as a place of interaction 
between NoPS and SSM members, it will mostly focus on the changes that were made 
to the EBA Regulation. Section 4 discusses alternative solutions for dealing with the 
SSM problematic within EBA. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Single Supervisory Mechanism and the European System of Financial 
Supervision: introducing the ECB and EBA 
The aim of this section is to present the SSM and the ESFS, and more specifically the 
role of the ECB under the former (a) and the role of EBA under the latter (b). Both 
actors are active in the banking field. But even though they have different roles under 
the SSM and the ESFS respectively, the establishment of the SSM will bring them 
into close contact (c).   
(a) The SSM and the ECB 
The establishment of the SSM must be seen in light of the EU’s efforts to stabilize the 
Eurozone following the 2007-08 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis. In June 2012, Eurozone leaders called for the establishment of the SSM in 
order to achieve a greater level of integration in banking supervision, but also as a 
condition for a possible direct recapitalisation of troubled banks by the European 
Stability Mechanism.5 The SSM brings together competent authorities of participating 
Member States. The latter are Member States of the Eurozone. However, non-euro 
zone Member States are also allowed to join, provided that they enter into a close 
cooperation arrangement with the ECB.6 The ECB is at the heart of the SSM. It is not 
only responsible ‘for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM’,7 but it is 
also a day-to-day supervisor which was vested with prudential supervisory tasks. The 
latter are specified in Council Regulation No 1024/2013. 8  Overall, the SSM 
supervisory model can be described as based on an ‘uploading’ and ‘unloading’ of 
supervisory tasks: ‘uploading’ because the ECB will directly supervise credit 
institutions as a result of the establishment of the SSM;9 ‘unloading’ because the ECB 
in its role as prudential supervisor will need to rely on the expertise and work of 
national authorities (e.g. to carry out day-to-day verifications)10 and because the ECB 
will only directly supervise a fraction of credit institutions; others will continue to be 
supervised at national level. Thus, ‘less significant’ credit institutions will as a general 
rule be supervised by the authorities of participating Member States. 11  The 
significance of a credit institution is in turn determined according to criteria set out in 
Council Regulation No 1024/2013 and which are further specified in an ECB 
framework regulation. 12  Council Regulation No 1024/2013 nevertheless makes it 
plain that a bank should generally ‘not be considered less significant’ – and hence be 
                                                          
5
 Euro Area Summit Statement (29 June 2012) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf.   
6
 Art. 7., Council Regulation No 1024/2013. 
7
 Art. 6(1).  
8
 Supra n. 1.  
9
 For a description of the ECB’s tasks, see Arts 4 and 5.   
10
 Rec (37).  
11
 Art. 6(4). See also rec (38).  
12
 Council Regulation No 1024/2013 refers to size, importance for the economy, or significance of 
cross-border activities (see Art. 6(4) sub-para 1). Significance is established on an individual or 
consolidated basis. Note that a branch opened in a participating Member State by a credit institution 
established in a NoPS will also be subject to assessment as a supervised entity under the criteria set out 
in Art 6(4).  
subject to direct supervision by the ECB – in one of the following scenarios: the total 
value of its assets is more than 30 billion euros; the ratio of its total assets over the 
GDP of the participating Member State represents more than 20% ‘unless the total 
value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion’; or where a national competent authority 
notifies the ECB that it considers an institution to be of significant domestic economic 
relevance and the ECB, after evaluation, confirms its significance. 13 An institution 
must also be considered significant where public financial assistance has been 
requested or received ‘directly from the ESFS or the ESM’.14 The regulation also 
provides for the ECB to consider of its own initiative an institution to be significant in 
case where the latter operates across the border by way of subsidiaries in at least one 
participating Member States and where its cross-border assets or liabilities ‘represent 
a significant part of its total assets or liabilities’.15 Finally, the regulation requires the 
ECB to carry out its supervisory tasks in relation to the ‘three most significant credit 
institutions’ in each participating Member State ‘unless justified by particular 
circumstances’.16  
In case where banks are not subject to the ECB’s direct supervision, they will 
continue being supervised by competent authorities of participating Member States. 
But even in this case, the ECB will solely be competent to (i) authorise or withdraw 
the authorisation of a credit institution and (ii) assess the notifications of the 
acquisition and disposal of holdings in credit institutions.17 In addition, even where 
direct supervision rests with national authorities, the latter are subject to the authority 
of the ECB, which has also an oversight role to play.18 Indeed, the regulation goes as 
                                                          
13
 Art. 6(4) sub-para 2, point (i)-(iii).  
14
 Art. 6(4), sub-para 4.   
15
 Art. 6(4) sub-para 3.  
16
 Art. 6(4) sub-para 5.   
17
 Art. 6(4).  
18
 Art. 6(5)(c).  
far as providing for a sort of ad hoc ‘uploading’ of oversight powers when allowing 
the ECB to take over the supervision of a credit institution which would otherwise be 
subject to national supervision.19  
 
(b) The ESFS and EBA  
The ESFS was created in 2010 as a response to the financial crisis and the 
recommendations of the de Larosière group, a group of experts set up by the 
Commission in 2008 in order to look into financial supervision.20 Its main aim is to 
make sure that EU rules in the financial sector are properly implemented.21 To meet 
its objectives, the ESFS brings together different actors: at macro-prudential level, the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established, a body without legal 
personality, which deals with macro-prudential oversight of the financial system.22 At 
micro-prudential level new European supervisory authorities (ESA) were established: 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and of course the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). 23  The latter is the ESA that is active in the banking field. Its 
membership reflects the fact that unlike the SSM, the ESFS covers the whole of the 
EU. Thus, the main decision-makers within EBA are competent authorities from the 
twenty-eight Member States. They are the voting members of EBA’s Board of 
Supervisors, the main forum of decision-making.24  
Turning to EBA’s role under the ESFS, the first point to note is that EBA has 
an important role to play in rule making. It participates in the creation of a so-called 
                                                          
19
 Art. 6(5)(b).  
20
 The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, Report (2009), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf>.  
21 Art. 2(1), EBA Regulation.  
22
 Art. 2(2). 
23
 Ibid.   
24
 Art. 40(1).  
single rulebook.
25
 For this purpose, it is vested with the power to develop draft 
technical standards, which are formally adopted by the Commission.
26
 EBA is also 
responsible for developing a so-called European supervisory handbook;
27
 it is 
supposed to monitor and assess market developments
28
 and it has an increasingly 
important role to play in relation to bank resolution and recovery.29 Crucially however 
EBA is not a day-to-day supervisor. In contrast to the ECB, the EBA model is not 
currently based on an ‘uploading’ of day-to-day supervisory tasks. Instead of a fully-
fledged transfer of competences, the EBA ‘supervisory’30 model is based on possible 
ad hoc interventions. These interventions are supposed to take place vis-à-vis 
competent authorities and possibly market actors in the case of (i) disagreements 
between competent authorities; (ii) breaches of EU law; (iii) emergency situations; or 
(iv) if it is necessary to temporarily ban or limit financial activities.
31
 The thrust of 
these intervention powers is that they are binding and allow EBA to intervene in the 
relationship between competent authorities, or more exceptionally, in the relationship 
between competent authorities and market actors. However, the possibility of ad hoc 
interventions is nevertheless limited. The provisions are carefully worded and EBA’s 
intervention will be subject to various conditions and requirements which are 
specified in the EBA Regulation and in sectoral legislation.
32
  
                                                          
25
 As called for by the European Council, 18/19 June 2009 (11225/2/09 Rev 2, 10 July 2009), para 20, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf.  
26
 Arts 10-15, EBA Regulation.  
27
 Art. 8(1)(aa). The ECB on the other hand will develop a so-called ‘supervisory manual’.    
28
 Art. 8(1)(f).  
29
 Art. 8(1)(i).  
30
 I am using the term ‘supervision’ loosely.  
31
 Arts 19, 17, 18 and 9(5), EBA Regulation.  
32
 For example, under the provisions on settling disagreements, breaches of EU law and emergency 
situations, EBA’s power to intervene in the relationship between a market actor and a competent 
authority is not envisaged as a first line of response. Rather any such intervention is only possible if the 
relevant competent authority fails to comply with an EBA decision or, in the case of breaches of EU 
law, a formal Commission opinion (see Arts 17(6), 19(4), 18(4)). The EBA Regulation also enacts a 
safeguard clause under Art. 38. The latter applies in case where EBA takes a decision vis-à-vis a 
competent authority under its provisions on the settlement of disagreements or emergency situations. 
Art. 38 allows a Member State, which believes that its fiscal responsibilities are affected by this 
 (c) Interactions between EBA and the ECB following the Establishment of the 
SSM 
The fact that the ECB and EBA are different actors with different roles does not mean 
that they do not interact. For one thing, both are active in the banking field and it is 
expected that EBA’s activities in the area of a single rulebook, a supervisory 
handbook and stress testing will bring them in close contact.
33
 There might also be a 
need to coordinate their activities at the international level.
34
 Moreover, recall that 
SSM members are also members of the ESFS. Indeed, the EBA Regulation now also 
lists the ECB as among competent (or supervisory) authorities which are part of the 
ESFS.
35
 It also includes the ECB within the definition of competent authorities.
36
 
Because of these amendments, the ECB will be subject to the authority of EBA. The 
latter will be able to carry out its tasks (for instance, its power to settle disagreements 
or to act in emergency situations) with respect to the ECB ‘as in relation to the other 
competent authorities’.37 The ECB will also be subject to the technical standards 
which EBA develops.
38
 Likewise, it will be subject to EBA’s guidelines and 
recommendations and to the provisions of the EBA Regulation on the EU supervisory 
handbook.
39
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
decision, to bring the matter in front of the Council. The latter may then decide the fate of EBA’s 
decision. It is also worth noting that the ambiguous wording of some of these provisions may also limit 
their usefulness (see e.g. in relation to Art. 19, A Enria ‘The Single Market after the Banking Union’ 
(Speech, Brussels, 18 November 2013) 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/490003/2013+11+18+-+AFME+-+EBF+-+Brussels+-
+A+Enria. 
33
 V Constâncio, Implications of the SSM on the ESFS (Public Hearing on Financial Supervision in the 
EU, Brussels, 24 May 2013) http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130524.en.html.  
34
 See in this context Art 8, Council Regulation No 1024/2013.  
35
 Art. 2(2)(f), EBA Regulation. 
36
 Art. 4(2)(i).  
37
 Rec (12), EBA Amending Regulation.  
38
 Art. 4(3) ECB Regulation.  
39
 Ibid.  
3. The Establishment of the SSM: the Approach to NoPS  
Section 2 introduced the ECB’s and EBA’s role under the SSM and the ESFS 
respectively. This section examines how the legislature sought to address the concerns 
which NoPS raised over the establishment of the SSM, especially in the context of 
EBA. Recall that while NoPS do not participate in the SSM, members of the SSM and 
NoPS participate in the ESFS and are members of EBA. This raised a number of 
issues for NoPS. I will begin by examining these issues (a), after which I will 
examine the safeguards which the legislature put in place in favour of NoPS (b). 
 
(a) The SSM Conundrum: the NoPS’ Concerns 
As noted earlier, NoPS such as the UK were concerned about the impact which the 
SSM would have on EBA and on decision-making within EBA.40 Specifically, they 
were concerned about the prospect of SSM members increasingly sharing common 
interests within EBA and NoPS losing influence as a result of ‘caucusing’ among 
SSM members.41 Underpinning these concerns was the view that NoPS and SSM 
members might in the future have conflicting preferences for courses of action within 
EBA, be that for instance on draft technical standards or on the use of EBA’s 
intervention powers. 
For NoPS, the issue was especially concerning because the establishment of 
the SSM results in a membership asymmetry within EBA. Even if the ECB has 
neither a vote in EBA nor is tasked with expressing a common position among SSM 
                                                          
40
 See e.g. House of Commons (Foreign Affairs Committee), The Future of the European Union: UK 
Government Policy (Volume I, 11 June 2013), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/87/87.pdf, 45 noting that the 
SSM ‘raised questions about the rights of non-Eurozone states in the European Banking Authority 
(EBA)’. 
41
 Evidence of these concerns can be found in various reports: see ibid. at 7, 42, 46, 47; HM 
Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union – The Single Market: Financial Services and the Free Movement of Capital (2014) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332874/2902400_BoC_
FreedomOfCapital_acc.pdf, 108. 
members,42 EBA’s Board of Supervisors – EBA’s main decision-making organ – will, 
following the establishment of the SSM, comprise voting members from both within 
and outside the SSM. Furthermore, while the SSM will initially be made of the 
current eighteen Eurozone Member States, the membership of the SSM will increase 
over time: either because non-euro Member States decide to join the SSM voluntarily; 
or because they meet the euro entry requirements and are therefore required to join 
the euro.43 In terms of EBA’s membership this means that the constellation of SSM 
members and NoPS is asymmetrical in the Board of Supervisors and will become 
increasingly so in the future – hence the concern over caucusing among SSM 
members.  
Admittedly, some might argue that the concerns of NoPS were misplaced. 
They might note – rightly so – that the precise impact which the SSM will have on the 
behavior of EBA’s members is yet unknown. 44 They might also argue that at any rate 
agency members have incentives to cooperate sincerely with one another. This is 
because – as members of a network – they are concerned about maintaining their 
reputation vis-à-vis their peers. 45  However, one should caution against 
overgeneralizing such claims. Even though there is a large body of scholarship on EU 
agencies, 46  actual decision-making dynamics within EU agencies have attracted 
                                                          
42
 As in the past, an ECB representative will sit on the Board of Supervisors of EBA (Art. 40(1)(d) 
EBA Regulation). 
43
 The only Member States which benefit from an ‘opt-out’ are the UK and Denmark.  
44
 Admittedly, concerns over caucusing among Eurozone countries are by no means shared by all. See, 
e.g., the evidence given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Permanent Representative of the UK to the EU in front of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee in February 2013 (House of Commons (Foreign Affairs Committee), 
The Future of the European Union: UK Government Policy (Volume II, 11 June 2013), 43-4, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/87/87ii.pdf). 
45
 This view is associated with G. Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration – The Ambiguities & 
Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (OUP 2009) 101. See also B. Eberlein and E. Grande, Beyond 
Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the EU Regulatory State 12 Journal of European 
Public Policy 89, 101 (2005), noting that networks transform national representatives “from ‘locals’ 
into ‘cosmopolitans’” (reference omitted).  
46
 See e.g. the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy in 2011 (issue 6). See also the 
early work of R. Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: the Role of European 
relatively little attention.47 At any rate, any view or theory, which is too deterministic 
of the decision-making dynamics in agencies, is unlikely to capture the full picture. 
There is much variation among agencies. They operate in a variety of fields, including 
in fields where there has traditionally been a degree of competition between states. 
Even matters that are described as technical can have salience at Member State level. 
As far as EBA and its sister agencies are concerned, recall also that decision-making 
is firmly in the hands of national authorities: i.e., competent authorities.48 Whilst the 
latter are meant to act in the public interest, they have nevertheless distinct 
organisational objectives and separate self-interest. Even if they are meant to act at 
arm’s length from national governments, they are accountable for their actions at 
Member State level (e.g. in front of national Parliaments).49 Hence, because of their 
national origins and their national accountability lines, it would be wrong to assume 
that competent authorities have necessarily the right incentives to genuinely cooperate 
when making decisions within the ESAs, especially when salient issues are involved. 
A number of recent reports lend support to these observations.50 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Agencies 4 Journal of European Public Policy 246 (1997); G. Majone, The New European Agencies: 
Regulation by Information 4 Journal of European Public Policy 262 (1997). 
47
 M. Egeberg and J. Trondal, EU-level Agencies: New Executive Centre Formation or Vehicles for 
National Control? 18 Journal of European Public Policy 868, 870 (2011).  
48
 Admittedly, the Commission is also likely to exert influence within agencies (see ibid). In relation to 
the ESA, see also F. Demarigny, J. McMahon and N. Robert, Review of the New European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) – Part 1, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/507446/IPOL-
ECON_ET(2013)507446_EN.pdf, 34, noting that ‘[i]n practice, discussions and decisions have been 
heavily influenced by the major NCAs [national competent authorities] and the European Commission’.  
49
 E.g. P. Schammo, EU Prospectus Law – New Perspectives on Regulatory Competition in Securities 
Markets (CUP 2011) 23-4; Demarigny, McMahon and Robert, supra n. 48 at 34.   
50
 While it is generally accepted that the ESAs have performed well (e.g. European Commission, 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), 
(COM(2014) 509 final) 2), the fact that national interests do matter and that the ESAs are not always 
places of genuine cooperation has been highlighted in a number of reports. The IMF for instance noted 
in 2013 that ‘national interests may still influence decisions’ in EBA (see IMF, European Union: 
Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation – Technical Note on European 
Banking Authority (March 2013, IMF Country Report No. 13/74) 7 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1374.pdf). More recently, the European Parliament 
noted in its resolution on the review of the European System of Financial Supervision that ‘it has been 
difficult for national representatives to separate their role of head of a national competent authority and 
To be sure, only time will tell whether NoPS’ concerns were justified. In any 
event, hereinafter, I will adopt assumptions similar to those which underpinned the 
legislative changes: i.e., that there is room for conflict between NoPS and SSM 
members and that the prospect of caucusing among SSM members, and the resultant 
marginalisation of NoPS, was a valid one. I feel free to take this approach because the 
aim of this chapter is not to question NoPS’ assumptions about the decision-making 
dynamics in EBA following the establishment of the SSM, but instead to assess what 
ought to be done if these assumptions prove to be accurate. I will begin by examining 
in more detail the way in which the legislature sought to protect the (minority) 
interests of NoPS.  
  
(b) The EU Legislature’s Approach to NoPS  
I will first examine how the EU legislature sought to protect the minority interests of 
NoPS (i), after which I will examine the relevant provisions critically (ii). Given our 
interest in EBA, I will focus on the safeguards that are found in the EBA Regulation.51 
 
(i) Safeguards 
                                                                                                                                                                      
European decision-making challenging their ability to genuinely adhere to the requirement to act 
independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 42 
of the ESA regulations’ (see European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2014 with recommendations 
to the Commission on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) Review (A7-0133/2014). 
In a similar fashion, ESMA’s Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group noted that the ESA’s 
governance represented the ‘main threat’ to the ESAs’ efficiency and that the composition of the 
boards of supervisors and management boards ‘embed[ded] the interests of national authorities’ (see 
ESMA Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group, SMSG contribution to the ESFS consultation, (18 
July 2013, SMSG/2013/013) 7. 
51
 The EU legislature also added a number ‘safeguard’ provisions to Council Regulation No 1024/2013. 
Art. 1 of Council Regulation No 1024/2013 provides that: ‘No action, proposal or policy of the ECB 
shall, directly or indirectly, discriminate against any Member State or group of Member States as a 
venue for the provision of banking or financial services in any currency’. The regulation also 
underlines the importance of maintaining the integrity or unity of the internal market (Art. 1; rec (10); 
rec (30)), in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council (e.g. European Council 
Conclusions 18/19 October 2012 (EUCO156/12, 19 October 2012), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf, paras 6 and 8)). 
Indeed, the regulation goes as far as saying that the ECB has a ‘duty of care for the unity and integrity 
of the internal market ...’ (Art. 1).  
The EU legislature sought to address the concerns of NoPS over the establishment of 
the SSM by amending or adding a number of provisions. What they have in common 
is that they are supposed to protect the interests of NoPS as members of the EU and as 
members of EBA. The recitals of the EBA Amending Regulation set the tone by 
highlighting the importance of maintaining the unity or integrity of the internal 
market, the cohesion of the Union and the need to prevent discrimination.52 NoPS’ 
concerns are also reflected in the legally binding text of the regulation. Thus, 
following amendment, the EBA Regulation states that EBA must act ‘independently, 
objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner, in the interests of the Union as a 
whole’.53 In an attempt to ensure ‘unbiased’ decision-making, amendments were also 
made to the provisions on the use of internal panels within EBA.54 Specifically, the 
mandatory use of panels was extended. Thus, EBA must now convene a panel when it 
seeks to use its powers to police breaches of EU law.55 The purpose of the panel is to 
propose a decision to the Board of Supervisors. Before amendment, the EBA 
regulation already provided for the Board of Supervisors to rely on panels. But a 
panel only had to be convened when EBA used its powers to settle disagreements.
56
  
However, the most noteworthy change in the EBA Regulation concerns the 
voting rules which apply in EBA’s Board of Supervisors. These changes aim to 
ensure that NoPS continue to have an effective voice in EBA. Recall that the voting 
members in EBA’s Board of Supervisors are competent (national) authorities. Simple 
majority voting continues to be the basic voting rule in EBA, with each voting 
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member having one vote.57 As in the past, this basic rule is modified in a number of 
cases. These cases were reviewed following the establishment of the SSM. Thus, 
decisions concerning the adoption of draft technical standards, as well as guidelines 
and recommendations continue to be adopted by a qualified majority, but this 
qualified majority must now include at least (i) a simple majority of board members 
representing competent authorities of Member States which participate in the SSM 
and (ii) a simple majority of board members representing competent authorities that 
are not among these Member States – NoPS in other words.58 The same rule applies in 
case where EBA adopts measures under Chapter VI (dealing with budgetary matters) 
or under the third sub-paragraph of Article 9(5) which applies where EBA 
temporarily prohibits or restricts certain financial activities and a Member State asks 
EBA to reconsider its decision.59  
Decisions concerning (i) breaches of EU law; (ii) the settlement of 
disagreements between competent authorities; and (iii) actions in emergency 
situations will be adopted by the Board of Supervisors on the basis of a simple 
majority of the voting members. However, this majority must now include (i) a simple 
majority of board members representing competent authorities of Member States 
which participate in the SSM and (ii) a simple majority of board members 
representing competent authorities that are not among these Member States.60 As far 
as EBA’s power to settle disagreements or to address breaches of EU law is 
concerned, the EU legislature added another requirement which will come to affect 
the voting modalities once the constellation of SSM members and NoPS becomes 
highly asymmetrical: i.e., in case where the number of NoPS drops to four or less. In 
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this case the double-majority rule will cease to apply. Instead decisions will be taken 
by a simple majority ‘which shall include at least one vote from members from 
competent authorities of non-participating Member States’.61 At the same time, a new 
review clause was added to the EBA regulation. 62  According to the latter, the 
Commission is required to review and report on the EBA voting arrangements, 
including those that apply to EBA panels, once the number of NoPS falls to four. To 
complicate matters further, the EU legislature added a ‘soft’ consensus principle, 
according to which the Board of Supervisors ‘shall strive for consensus’ when making 
decisions.63 Finally, the composition of the Management Board now also reflects the 
new realities of closer integration among SSM members. EBA’s Management Board 
ensures inter alia that EBA carries out its mission and its tasks.64 It is made of the 
Chairperson and six voting members – hence six national authorities – of the Board of 
Supervisors.65 Following amendment, the EBA Regulation now states that among the 
members of the Management Board at least two should be representatives from 
NoPS.66   
 
(ii) The Legislature’s Approach: an ill-considered Approach 
My aim here is to reflect on the above changes. I will argue that the EU legislature’s 
amendments to the EBA Regulation are open to criticism on at least two grounds: first, 
because they failed to take account of the lessons of the past; second, because the EU 
legislature failed to differentiate meaningfully between the interests of Member States 
and the proper functioning of EBA. 
                                                          
61
 Art. 44(1) sub-para 4.  
62
 Art. 81a.  
63
 Art. 44(4a).   
64
 Art. 47(1).  
65
 Art. 45(1).  
66
 Art. 45(1).  
 - failure to take account of the lessons of the past 
In order to examine how the legislature failed to give proper consideration to past 
lessons, I will begin with the ESAs’ predecessors – the so-called ‘Level 3’ 
supervisory committees: CESR, CEBS, and CEIOPS. The Level 3 committees were 
collective actors.67 They had no independent, overriding choice over their preferences, 
but depended on the preferences of national authorities. 68  This could complicate 
effective decision-making, not least because decisions were initially taken by 
consensus.69 Unsurprisingly the consensus principle was modified in 2009. To address 
the threat of deadlocks or decisions at the lowest common denominator, new 
arrangements provided for decisions to be taken by qualified majority, but only where 
no consensus could be reached.70  
Turning to the ESAs, the first point to note is that at least in one important 
respect the ESAs are like their predecessors: competent authorities, as voting 
members of the Board of Supervisors or as members of the Management Board, are 
the main decision-makers within the ESAs. However there are important differences 
in terms of decision-making. In particular, when establishing the ESAs, the EU 
legislature adopted different voting requirements: decisions were as a rule to be 
adopted by a simple majority. Qualified majority voting was only applicable in 
specific cases and by way of derogation from the simple majority rule. These changes 
reflected the lessons of the past. Whilst not abandoning the collective nature of 
decision-making by competent authorities (as voting members of the ESAs), they 
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reflected attempts to facilitate decision-making in the face of divisions between voting 
members. The changes proved useful. Especially the new voting requirements made a 
positive contribution to the functioning of the ESAs.
71
 
As we have seen in the previous sub-section, closer integration led to a rethink 
of the voting arrangements in EBA. To fully appreciate the issues which these 
changes raise, it is worth contrasting the changes which the EU legislature adopted 
with those that the Commission proposed. In its proposal, the Commission sought to 
rely more on sub-delegation. It proposed to strengthen the role of independent 
panels.72 Panels would be required to propose decisions to the Board of Supervisors 
not only for the purposes of settling disagreements under Article 19, but also in 
relation to breaches of EU law under Article 17.73 As before, the panels would be 
made of the (full-time) EBA Chairperson and two (voting) members of the Board of 
Supervisors.74 Given that EBA’s Chairperson is a member of the panel ex officio, 
members of the Board of Supervisors were left with only two members to appoint to 
the panel. Under the Commission proposals, at least one them was supposed to be 
from a NoPS. 75  Significantly, the Commission proposed that panel decisions be 
adopted by EBA unless rejected by the Board of Supervisors by way of a simple 
majority. This majority had to include at least three votes from members of states 
participating in the SSM and three votes from NoPS.76 It is plain that this ‘reverse 
voting mechanism’ would have weakened the influence of the Board of Supervisors 
over the decisions taken by the independent panel since panel decisions could only be 
blocked if voting members from within and outside the SSM had a shared interest in 
                                                          
71
 Demarigny, McMahon and Robert, supra n. 48 at 34. 
72
 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 ..., (COM(2012) 512 final, September 2012).  
73
 Art. 41(2) (as proposed).  
74
 Ibid.  
75
 Ibid.  
76
 Art. 44(1) (as proposed).  
doing so.  
The EU legislature’s approach was notably different. Its response to the 
establishment of the SSM was to reaffirm the say of board members over EBA’s 
decisions and to cement more forcefully the division between SSM members and 
NoPS in the voting structure of EBA’s Board of Supervisor: we saw the voting 
arrangements earlier. Thus, the legislature rejected the idea of a reverse voting 
mechanism and extended the double-majority system. It also strengthened the 
influence of the Board of Supervisors over the panels. As amended, panels will be 
made of the Chairperson and six other EBA members who are, according to recital 
(15) of EBA’s Amending Regulation, voting members of the Board of Supervisors – 
hence national authorities. Panel decisions are adopted ‘where at least four members 
vote in favour’.77 As Ferran and Babis note, the thinking was that by broadening the 
participation of Member States, the position of the panel would be strengthened.78 
However, by widening participation, these amendments also effectively lessened the 
influence of the only full-time independent EBA representative: that is EBA’s 
Chairperson. The EU legislature also introduced a general ‘soft’ consensus principle 
for decisions taken by the Board of Supervisors. As noted above, the Board of 
Supervisors must now ‘strive for consensus’ when making decisions.79 Although the 
requirement to strive for consensus is meant to be without prejudice ‘to the 
effectiveness of the Authority’s decision-making procedures’, 80  for a supposedly 
technocratic body such as a EBA whose decisions ought to be argument- or evidence-
based, the merit of the consensus principle is nevertheless questionable – not least 
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because it will make it more complicated to impose decisions in the face of 
differences between competent authorities.  
Hence, in short, the Commission’s proposed response to closer integration 
among Eurozone members was to put greater emphasis on a ‘sub-delegation’ and to 
weaken the influence of EBA’s Board of Supervisors in the process. However, the 
Commission failed to deal comprehensively with the issues raised by closer 
integration when proposing revisions to the voting arrangements. For the EU 
legislature, closer integration meant that the national influence over EBA had to be 
maintained if not strengthened. As a result, the EU legislature reaffirmed the 
influence of EBA’s Board of Supervisors over EBA. In conclusion, it can be 
suggested that closer integration among SSM members has brought about a change of 
thinking: whilst in the past the EU legislature was concerned about putting in place 
modalities for ensuring that the ESAs could make decisions in the face of divisions 
between their members (e.g. simple majority voting, no consensus requirement), the 
more recent changes suggest that the EU legislature now considers that divisions in 
EBA are an inevitable outcome of closer integration among SSM members and that 
protecting the interests of Member States, especially the minority interests of NoPS, 
justifies the potential costs associated with new, more burdensome, decision-making 
arrangements (double majority system; soft consensus requirement).  
 
- failure to differentiate meaningfully between the interests of Member States and the 
proper functioning of EBA 
It is plain that from an EU point of view, the legislature’s concern with Member State 
interests is not unproblematic. The new decision-making arrangements might well be 
at the expense of the effective functioning of an EU body (EBA). However for the EU 
legislature, it was no cause for concern. From its perspective, the point was simply 
that EBA would no longer function properly if the voice of NoPS were at risk of 
being marginalised in EBA.81 Thus (i) the need to protect the interests of Member 
States – especially the interests of NoPS – and (ii) the need to ensure the proper 
functioning of EBA required one and the same solution: that is changing the voting 
modalities. This thinking is reflected in Rec (14) of the EBA Amending Regulation 
which states that the amendments to the decision-making arrangements in the Board 
of Supervisors were necessary in order to ‘ensure that the interests of all Member 
States are adequately taken into account and to allow for the proper functioning of 
EBA ... ’. Yet, this approach, which does not meaningfully differentiate between these 
two objectives, is open to criticism. In contrast to an intergovernmental ‘club’ such as 
the Council, EBA is (normatively speaking) not a forum for defending and promoting 
Member State interests.82 Agencies are generally established for their technical and 
scientific know-how: ‘[t]he independence of their technical and/or scientific 
assessments is ... their real raison d’être’ according to the Commission. 83  Hence, 
while it is plain that the proper functioning of an institution such as the Council must 
be seen as closely linked to the issue of protecting the interests of Member States, the 
same is not true for an EU agency such as EBA. To be sure, protecting the interests of 
Member States – i.e., Member States’ interests in ensuring that the voice of their 
competent authorities cannot systematically be marginalised in EBA – is a legitimate 
aim given the pivotal role which competent authorities play as decision-makers in 
EBA. But the question of whether EBA functions properly cannot simply be reduced 
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to the issue of whether the interests of Member States are taken account of.  
But how then assess if EBA functions properly? Instead of amalgamating the 
above objectives, a more promising way is to turn to EBA’s founding regulation. 
EBA depends for its operation on the rules that are set out therein; it owes its 
existence to it. Among other things, the regulation defines requirements and rules 
which EBA must observe when exercising its statutory tasks and in doing so sets 
constraints on the choices that competent authorities, as voting members of EBA, can 
make when exercising their decision-making powers. Article 1(5) lays down the basic 
requirements which EBA must satisfy. Pursuant to this provision, EBA is meant to act 
independently, objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner when exercising its 
tasks. Importantly, it must also act ‘in the interests of the Union as a whole’. Hence, 
the question of whether EBA functions properly should be assessed in light of the 
requirements of Article 1(5). They essentially establish a baseline for assessing 
acceptable EBA behaviour and in doing so allow determining whether EBA functions 
properly. Moreover, these requirements are by no means trivial. Principles such as 
independence, objectivity, or indeed the requirement to act in the EU interest are not 
unique to EBA. They reflect more deep-rooted expectations about the behaviour of 
agencies or other EU bodies.84 Given their importance, they are unlikely to be called 
into question by the EU legislature.  
However, once we accept that the proper functioning of EBA should be 
determined along the above lines, the legislature’s approach to decision-making in 
EBA suffers from a serious weakness: it is difficult to resolve successfully the 
conundrum of giving proper consideration to the interests of M-Ss (especially, the 
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minority interests of NoPS) whilst ensuring that EBA can function properly. This is 
because the new voting arrangements will complicate, if not obstruct, decision-
making in EBA. 85  Moreover, the voting arrangements will become especially 
problematic once the constellation of NoPS and SSM members becomes highly 
asymmetrical in the Board of Supervisors.86 This is because it will give any remaining 
NoPS a disproportionate say over EBA’s activities and indeed ultimately the last 
remaining NoPS, a veto power.87 Such a voting system is not in the interest of the 
Union as a whole and will therefore not contribute to the proper functioning of EBA. 
4. Alternative Approaches 
It is useful to begin by summarising our argument so far. The previous section 
examined the changes which the EU legislature made to EBA’s founding regulation 
in order to protect Member State interests’, especially the minority interests of NoPS. 
I criticised the legislature for failing to differentiate meaningfully between two 
objectives: taking account of Member State interests (especially, protecting the 
minority interests of NoPS against the majority interests of the SSM) and ensuring 
that EBA can function properly. In this context, I submitted that the safeguards which 
the legislature adopted (i.e., a double-majority system and a ‘soft’ consensus 
principle) did not offer a proper balance between these two objectives. I concluded by 
noting that that the new decision-making arrangements in EBA complicated (at best) 
decision-making and if the number of NoPS continued to fall, the voting 
arrangements would increasingly be unfit for purpose. None of this is in the interest of 
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the Union as a whole and as such does not contribute to the proper functioning of 
EBA. This section evaluates alternative ways for dealing with the above objectives. 
The aim is to find a better balance between them.  
I will consider two types of strategies: fitting EBA’s functions to its 
governance (hence varying its functions) (a) or fitting its governance to its functions 
(hence varying its governance structure) (b). I will argue that the main weakness of 
the first strategy is that it is inadequate for addressing relevant issues or that it simply 
concedes that the ESA model has failed. The main weakness of the second strategy is 
that it demands significant concessions from Member States which might prove a step 
too far for NoPS in particular.  
 
(a) Varying EBA’s Functions: Fitting Functions to Governance 
Under this first approach, the current EBA governance model, which vests 
overwhelmingly decision-making powers in national authorities, is maintained. 
However, instead of relying on cumbersome voting arrangements such as the double-
majority system, EBA’s functions are reassessed following the establishment of the 
SSM. This re-assessment also extends to the requirements which EBA members 
ought to satisfy when carrying out these functions. I will start with these requirements, 
which I will call ‘rules of conduct’.  
 
(i) Setting ‘Rules of Conduct’?  
‘Rules of conduct’ might a priori be a first possible line of response to closer 
integration among SSM members. 88  Rules of conduct are defined as ex ante 
requirements which target the behaviour of competent authorities when taking 
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decisions in EBA. Their purpose would be to deal with potential spillovers affecting 
decision-making within EBA (e.g. caucusing among SSM members in EBA). By 
targeting the behaviour of EBA’s members (competent authorities), these rules would 
arguably also improve EBA’s functioning. However, it is questionable whether such a 
strategy would have much to offer. Spillovers that affect decision-making can be 
difficult to address. Take the example of ‘caucusing’ among SSM members. Such a 
practice would leave NoPS without an effective say over EBA’s decisions. Yet, there 
is in itself nothing illegitimate about SSM members sharing common preferences for 
courses of actions within EBA. If caucusing occurs, it will reflect converging interests 
among SSM members which is ultimately the consequence of all Member States 
having agreed to establish the SSM.  
There are other problems with rules of conduct. For one thing, they must be 
properly monitored and enforced. This may well prove problematic. Consider in this 
context Article 42 of the EBA Regulation which requires (inter alia) the voting 
members of EBA’s Board of Supervisors to act ‘in the sole interest of the Union as a 
whole’. Recall also that following amendment, the EBA Regulation states that the 
Board of Supervisors should ‘strive for consensus when taking its decisions’.89 Both 
provisions target the behaviour of competent authorities; both can be described as 
rules of conduct. However, as Wymeersch notes, it is hard to see how the requirement 
to act in the EU’s interest could effectively be enforced.90 The same appears to be true 
of the requirement to ‘strive for consensus’. It is questionable whether the European 
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Court of Justice would consider itself able to carry out an extensive review of this 
requirement.91  
 
(ii) Allowing for Dissenting Views? 
The EU legislature might also consider taking more drastic action. For example, it 
might allow competent authorities, which hold minority views, to adopt dissenting 
views within EBA: for instance, on draft technical standards. 92  Recall that EBA 
adopts these draft standards in order to contribute to a single rulebook. Allowing for 
dissenting views could be an effective means to deal with caucusing among SSM 
members. It might also contribute to resolving bottlenecks and hence allow decision-
making to progress in all other matters in the interest of the Union as a whole.  
However, here too, there are complications. First of all, dissenting views on 
draft standards would have no binding force unless the Commission would endorse 
them together with the draft technical standards to which they relate. Furthermore, it 
is plain that a system based on dissenting views would threaten to exacerbate 
differences between NoPS and SSM members. Crucially, such a system would risk 
undermining the so-called single rulebook, which as an objective, is closely 
associated with the establishment of the ESFS.93 A fragmented rulebook would in turn 
be difficult to reconcile with a basic principle underpinning the SSM: that is, 
preserving the unity and integrity of the internal market. The latter is a principle that 
the UK sought to uphold during the negotiations, but which was also endorsed by the 
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European Council in its conclusions94 and given a legislative basis in Article 1 of 
Council Regulation No 1024/2013. 95  Hence, a system based on dissenting views 
would not be in the interest of the Union as a whole and would therefore not 
contribute to the proper functioning of EBA.  
 
(iii) Abolishing some of EBA’s Functions? 
An even more drastic change would be to abolish some of EBA’s functions: for 
example, some or all of EBA’s intervention powers. It would arguably be a pragmatic 
response to closer integration among SSM members, especially if the constellation of 
NoPS and SSM members becomes highly asymmetrical in EBA’s Board of 
Supervisors. It would recognise that EBA is not a supranational actor and that it faces 
limitations when using its intervention powers in a post-SSM world where its 
members are either within or outside the SSM. Take for example the case where EBA 
would attempt to use its dispute settlement powers in a disagreement between two 
powerful institutions such as the Bank of England and the ECB: the former being the 
central bank of possibly the only Member State which might not be part of the SSM 
in the future; the latter being at the heart of the SSM and as such at the heart of the 
concerns of its members. 96  The point is that EBA will find it difficult to act 
independently, objectively and in the interest of the Union as a whole if its 
intervention powers are targeted at those that decide over them.97  
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However, simply abolishing some or all of EBA’s intervention powers in 
response to this conundrum is not an attractive solution either. The ESA’s 
intervention powers were among the main innovations introduced under the ESFS. 
Abandoning them would in many ways leave the ESFS toothless. Meanwhile, the 
issues which they were meant to address – e.g. a lack of cooperation between 
competent authorities or a lack of consistency in a crisis situation – and which the 
establishment of the SSM might come to exacerbate would remain unaddressed.  
 
(b) Varying EBA’s Governance: Fitting Governance to Functions 
In the preceding part, I found fault with all of the contemplated strategies. This 
section considers a different approach to the post-SSM conundrum. Under this 
approach, EBA’s functions are maintained but its governance model is reassessed. 
Specifically the proposal is to add a group of appointed members – I will refer to 
them as trustees – to the Board of Supervisors. Like EBA’s chairperson and executive 
director, these members would be full-time independent professionals.  
 The idea of rethinking the membership of the ESAs’ boards of supervisors has 
gained currency in recent years. For example, ESMA’s Securities and Markets 
Stakeholder Group suggested in relation to the ESAs, that each Supervisory Board 
should include six independent members which should also be members of the 
respective ESA management boards. 98  Likewise, a report commissioned by the 
European Parliament concluded that the supervisory boards of the ESAs should 
include a number of full-time members. 99  Following this report, the European 
Parliament in its March 2014 resolution on the ESFS recommended that the ESA 
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management boards should be staffed by professionals who should become voting 
members of the ESA supervisory boards.100  
Hereinafter, I will examine whether the basic idea of reorganising the Board of 
Supervisors and relying on appointed members has anything to offer in the context of 
closer integration among SSM members.101 I will begin by considering the rationale 
for relying on independent appointees (or ‘trustees’) (i), after which I will specify 
their tasks (ii).  
 
(i) Independent Appointees as Trustees 
The idea of relying on independent full-time appointed members or ‘trustees’ is 
examined here as a way to improve the balance between the two objectives identified 
earlier: i.e., to take account of the interests of Member States in a post-SSM world 
(especially, NoPS’ interests not to be marginalised by a majority of SSM members in 
EBA) and ensuring that EBA can function properly. The notion of ‘trustee’ is 
borrowed from Majone who looked at the concept when attempting to explain the 
thinking behind different forms of delegation.102 For the present purposes, the analogy 
with the concept of trust has some usefulness, for it allows highlighting the basic 
characteristics of appointed members. Translated into the present context, the point is 
that the new EBA board members would be appointed in order to act independently 
and in the best interest of their sole beneficiary: that is the Union as a whole.  
Hence, as trustees, appointed members would act independently of national 
interests. That is not to say that trustees would necessarily be inimical to Member 
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State interests. For one thing, there is no reason to think that the Union’s interests and 
Member State interests are necessarily exclusive of each other. Also, by defining the 
role of trustees in the above manner (i.e. to act independently and solely in the interest 
of the Union as a whole), it is possible to give consideration to both objectives. Thus, 
by acting independently and in the interest of the Union as a whole, trustees would 
seek to ensure that EBA functions properly. Moreover, by acting in this manner, they 
would also, within the limits of their powers, aim to make sure that EBA does not act 
in the interests of a group of Member States only: SSM members or NoPS for that 
matter. That said, the need to improve the balance of interests might well require a 
line to be drawn. Thus, whilst protecting NoPS from being systematically 
marginalised is a legitimate objective, ultimately any measure aimed at achieving this 
objective must not conflict with the proper functioning of EBA.   
To be sure, a strategy that relies on independent trustees might be open to 
criticism on a number of grounds. Some might argue that I place too much ‘trust’ in 
full-time, independent appointees. In this context, they might point out that the 
objective of acting in the ‘interest of the Union as a whole’ does not allow prescribing 
in advance a single specific course of action.
103
 The critique is beside the point. I use 
the notion of trustees precisely because appointees must be capable of making 
independent choices. Moreover, the point about independent full-time appointees is 
not that they are meant to be perfectly benevolent actors but that in comparison to 
actors which are embedded in a national context, independent appointees (whose self-
interest is moreover closely intertwined with the fate of EBA) are comparatively more 
likely to identify themselves with EBA’s objectives and thus to give them due 
consideration when deciding over different courses of action.  
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Others might object to the idea of reserving the role of trustees to full-time 
appointed members only. They might argue that currently EBA’s Board of 
Supervisors is mainly made of heads of independent administrative authorities who 
are already subject to a statutory duty to act in the interest of the Union as a whole.
104
 
There is however a crucial difference between full-time appointed members and heads 
of agencies. The ‘primary institutional affiliation’ 105  of heads of agencies is to 
institutions at national level: i.e., competent authorities. They are accountable for their 
actions/inactions to national actors (e.g. national parliaments) who have national 
interests in mind. Not only is the self-interest of heads of agencies intertwined with 
the fate of the authorities which they head, but they are also likely to identify 
themselves strongly with the separate organizational objectives of these agencies. 
Indeed, one can expect heads of agencies to have a particularly strong sense of 
affiliation.106 On the other hand, full-time, independent appointees would have no 
affiliation to institutions at Member State level. Their sole affiliation would be to 
EBA. The assumption is that by insulating them in this manner, they would be better 
placed to act independently of national interests and in accordance with the 
requirements of EBA’s founding regulation and Article 1(5) in particular.107  
                                                          
104
 Art. 42 EBA Regulation.  
105
 I borrow the phrase from M. Egeberg, Experiments in Supranational Institution-Building: the 
European Commission as a Laboratory, 19 Journal of European Public Policy (2012) 939, 939.  
106
 See also European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2014 supra n. 50, noting that ‘it has been 
difficult for national representatives to separate their role of head of a national competent authority and 
European decision-making challenging their ability to genuinely adhere to the requirement to act 
independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 42 
of the ESA regulations’.  
107
 Admittedly, even in the absence of a national institutional affiliation, appointees still have national 
(Member State) origins. These origins might still be seen as having an impact on the issue of 
independence. It is worth noting in this context that if appointees are supposed to be judged on the 
basis of their independence, integrity and competence, there is no reason why they should not be third 
country nationals. This is all the more so for a body such as EBA which is not a policy-making body. 
There is some literature which examines the impact of nationality in the context of the European 
Commission. Egeberg differentiates between Commission officials and Commissioners (Egeberg, 
supra n. 105). After reviewing various studies, he notes with respect to Commission officials that even 
though nationality is not unimportant in all respects, ‘nationality clearly plays a minor role’ (ibid. 947). 
With regard to Commissioners, he concludes that nationality probably matters more, but ‘nationality is 
  
(ii) Tasks of Trustees 
So far, I considered the basic rationale for appointing independent ‘trustees’ to EBA’s 
Board of Supervisor. Ultimately, however, the merit of this approach depends on the 
powers which trustees are vested with. Hereinafter, I will consider the merit of a two-
stage approach. The basic thinking behind this approach is that the issues which the 
current voting arrangements raise will become more severe as the membership 
asymmetry between SSM members and NoPS in EBA’s Board of Supervisors 
increases.  
 
- first stage  
As noted, initially, we assume that the membership asymmetry between NoPS and 
SSM members in EBA is not too great. The current voting arrangements would 
therefore remain in place. Competent authorities, especially those originating from 
NoPS, would continue benefiting from the double-majority voting system. However, 
in order to improve the balance between the two objectives mentioned earlier, trustees 
would be appointed to the Board of Supervisors. Initially, they would participate in a 
non-voting capacity and their tasks within the board would be limited to monitoring 
and offering opinions on all matters, including on draft standards.
 108
 This type of 
independent scrutiny appears necessary in order to address, inter alia, the prospect of 
draft technical standards being watered down in the Board of Supervisors. This is not 
                                                                                                                                                                      
only one of several parts of their compound role, and not necessarily the part most frequently evoked’ 
(ibid.). At any rate, he notes that in comparison to politicians with a ‘secondary affiliation to a purely 
territorially arranged structure’ – he points to the European Council – the behaviour of Commissioners 
is still markedly different (ibid.).  
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 Opinions on draft technical standards would obviously be considered by the Commission. 
an unlikely prospect. Recall that board members must now ‘strive for consensus’ 
when making decisions.  
In addition to their role in the Board of Supervisors, trustees would be vested 
with one major task: to make sure that competent authorities ‘play by the rules’. The 
rationale for this proposal has to do with the consequences of differentiated 
integration. Specifically, the point is that differentiated integration can give rise to 
important externalities.
109
 In the case of the SSM, these externalities can a priori be 
imposed by SSM members or by NoPS (e.g. trade deflections as a result of 
differences in the application of common rules). It is therefore in the common interest 
of all the Member States that the power to deal with such externalities belongs to 
actors who are different from those that can impose such externalities.
110
 Two of 
EBA’s intervention powers are closely related to this task: the power to participate in 
policing breaches of Union law under Article 17 and the power to settle 
disagreements under Article 19 of the EBA Regulation. Currently these powers are 
not administered independently: competent authorities, as voting members of EBA’s 
Board of Supervisors, decide over their use. This state of affairs is unsatisfactory and 
will be even more so under EBA’s new voting arrangements. As noted earlier, the 
latter will complicate, if not obstruct, decision-making. Hence in the presence of 
externalities it is in the interest of both Member States and EBA that the power to 
settle disagreements and police breaches of EU law be vested in trustees. Trustees 
will be better placed to ensure that EBA can act independently and by doing so ensure 
that all competent authorities play by the rules.111  
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 - second stage  
Further changes will be necessary if the constellation of NoPS and SSM members 
becomes highly asymmetrical in the Board of Supervisors. 112  This is because the 
current voting arrangements will increasingly be unfit for purpose in this case: as the 
number of NoPS continues to diminish, any remaining NoPSs (indeed possibly only 
the UK) will be left with a disproportionate say over EBA’s activities. As noted 
earlier, such a state of affairs is not in the interest of the Union as a whole and will not 
therefore contribute to the proper functioning of EBA. However, simply abandoning 
EBA’s double-majority system with no further changes is not in the Union’s interests 
either, as it would give the SSM an in-built majority in EBA.  
To address this conundrum, it is suggested that the role of trustees be 
reassessed at this stage. A possible way forward is for them to become more actively 
involved in decision-making in the Board of Supervisors. Specifically, trustees should 
be given the right to vote alongside competent authorities. The guiding principle 
underpinning such a change was repeatedly mentioned: to find a better balance 
between (i) ensuring that EBA can function properly and (ii) making sure that the 
interests of Member States are taken into account. Whilst the first objective pleads 
against maintaining the current voting modalities once the composition of the board is 
highly asymmetrical, the second rules out a wholesale transfer of decision-making 
powers to trustees. Thus, to improve the balance of interests, it is suggested that the 
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way forward is to maintain a double-majority requirement
113
 between SSM members 
and NoPS, but to provide for trustees to act as a third group of voting members. The 
crux of this approach is that a decision would no longer necessarily require votes from 
both NoPS and SSM members. Under the proposed voting system, an EBA decision 
could be adopted with either the support of SSM members or NoPS, provided that a 
decision would also have the unanimous support of trustees. Such a system would 
arguably be superior for a number of reasons. For one thing, NoPS would continue 
benefiting from a double-majority requirement (or a similar arrangement which seeks 
to protect the say of NoPS by differentiating between them and SSM members for 
voting purposes)
114
 in their interactions with SSM members. In particular, the 
requirement would continue protecting any remaining NoPS from the SSM’s in-built 
majority in EBA. At the same time, however, the new voting system would allow 
mitigating the effects of an increasingly asymmetrical Board of Supervisors. 
Specifically, the new modalities would contribute to preventing a very small number 
of NoPS from having a disproportionate say over EBA’s actions. An EBA decision 
could henceforth be adopted with the support of a majority of SSM members, 
provided that such a decision would benefit from the unanimous support of 
trustees.
115
  Moreover, by allowing EBA to adopt a decision in this way, the proposed 
voting modalities would contribute to resolving any bottlenecks which may come to 
obstruct decision-making under the current voting system. Trustees would be held to 
decide unanimously in order to give their decisions greater legitimacy. Moreover, 
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their duty to act in the sole interest of the Union as a whole would rule out any action 
or decision which would be bluntly in favour of either the SSM or NoPS.  
It is important to stress that a more active involvement of trustees would not 
prevent NoPS and SSM members from reaching common decisions without the 
support of trustees. Moreover, trustees would have no power to make decisions 
unilaterally, except as far as dispute settlement and breaches of EU law are concerned. 
As argued earlier, it is in the interests of all the Member States that these powers be 
administered independently.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to consider ways in which EBA could move forward in the 
wake of the establishment of the SSM. I have focused on defining the basic principles 
of an approach which seeks to rely on independent, full-time, appointed members. 
Admittedly, this approach would require further elaboration. Questions such as the 
appointment procedure of trustees, their term of office, their accountability 
procedures are just a few questions which I have left open. Moreover, it is plain that 
implementing this approach would require concessions from Member States which 
some might be unwilling to make. Political feasibility therefore remains an issue. In 
this chapter, I have resisted taking the path of least (political) resistance. Instead, I 
have put forward ambitious proposals in an effort to open a necessary debate on the 
future governance of EBA following the establishment of the SSM. The point is that 
EBA’s current voting arrangements are unlikely to offer a lasting solution. They will 
ultimately need to be reassessed if the number of NoPS falls over time.  
That said, in order to improve the odds of the proposals, a range of strategies 
could a priori be envisaged. Aspects such as those left open could be subject to 
negotiation as long as they do not undermine the basic principles outlined above. 
Safeguards could be put in place or simply re-affirmed. For instance, transferring day-
to-day supervisory powers to the ESAs should be ruled out. As far as Article 19 
(dispute settlement) is concerned, it is also important to stress that conciliation would 
continue to be a first line of response. Thus competent authorities would remain free 
to reach an agreement on their own during an initial conciliation phase. Moreover, as 
far as Article 17 is concerned, the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, would 
obviously continue playing a pivotal role under this provision. The role of trustees 
would as a result be limited.  
Before drawing this chapter to a close, it is worth considering one final point 
with respect to the UK. In this chapter, I was interested in the choices which the EU 
and thus the UK might come to face with regard to EBA if the UK stays in the EU as 
a NoPS: that is, as a state which is not, and does not intend to be, part of the SSM or 
the Banking Union for that matter. Hence, I was not primarily interested in assessing 
the consequences of a total exit by the UK of the EU. In terms of the narrative of the 
book, the situation which I described and examined was therefore closer to a partial 
withdrawal than a total withdrawal by the UK. It is plain that if the UK were to leave 
the EU, it would no longer be a NoPS. It would no longer be a voting member of 
EBA either. That is not to say, however, that the UK would necessarily be shielded 
from the effects of closer integration among SSM members. Externalities, for 
example, can be imposed on third countries just as they can be imposed on NoPS. On 
the other hand, in the unlikely event of the UK joining the SSM, the UK would no 
longer be a NoPS either. Under the SSM, it would be treated as a non-euro 
participating Member State. It would continue to be part of EBA, but it would also be 
subject to the authority of the ECB in its new role as prudential supervisor. In both 
cases (total exit or participation), the problematic which is discussed above would 
find a simple resolution, provided of course that all other (non-euro) Member States 
were ready to join the SSM. There would no longer be a need for complicated voting 
arrangements in EBA. Both scenarios (total exit or participation) remain however 
uncertain prospects at the time of writing.  
